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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, North Dakota surpassed every state except Texas in 
oil production.1 It is common knowledge that the oil boom has 
flooded the state with money and allowed it to maintain impressive 
budget surpluses while other states in the nation saw distinct 
budget shortfalls.2 There are, however, many negative impacts of 
the oil boom: farmers and ranchers dealing with the impacts of 
energy development are often frustrated by a distinct disparity 
between the talk of money flooding into the state, and what is 
perceived as a confusing parsimony when it comes to compensating 
landowners for land that is taken or damaged by the energy 
industry.3 
This Article will provide background information regarding 
environmental damage caused by energy development,4 and will 
consider the remedies available in North Dakota for landowners, 
 
 1.  Stephen J. Lee, N.D. Becomes No. 2 Oil Producing State, Trailing Only Texas, 
BAKKEN TODAY (May 16, 2012, 1:08 PM), http://www.bakkentoday.com/event 
/article/id/33956. 
 2.  See Dennis Cauchon, North Dakota Economy Booms, Population Soars, USA 
TODAY (Mar. 17, 2011, 5:59 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation 
/census/2011-03-16-north-dakota-census_N.htm. 
 3.  See, e.g., Deborah Sontag & Robert Gebeloff, The Downside of the Boom, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/23/us 
/north-dakota-oil-boom-downside.html?_r=0. 
 4.  See infra Part II. 
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with comparisons to certain trends and remedies around the 
country.5 Further, it will argue that the remedies generally available 
are in need of reconsideration, and that legal interpretations 
asserted by the energy industry are often erroneous, and more 
importantly, unnecessarily attempt to limit the recovery of 
landowners whose land has been taken or damaged for energy 
development.6 The Article will focus on North Dakota law and 
cases, and the author’s experience litigating on behalf of 
landowners in North Dakota. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In 2014, the New York Times reported that “[f]or those who 
champion fossil fuels as the key to America’s energy independence, 
North Dakota is an unrivaled success.”7 It also noted that “state 
leaders rarely mention the underside of the boom and do not 
release even summary statistics about environmental incidents and 
enforcement measures.”8 Between April 1, 2010, and July 1, 2014, 
North Dakota’s population grew by 9.9 percent, three times the 
rate of the nation in general.9 In recent years, North Dakota has 
had record budget surpluses while the rest of the nation has 
struggled.10 The budget surplus in June of 2011 was $996.8 million, 
which was the highest end-of-biennium balance in North Dakota’s 
history.11 
But while North Dakota’s coffers have been full, not all North 
Dakotans have benefited equally from the oil boom. For the owners 
of the surface of the land, things do not always look as positive. 
According to one report, “more than 18.4 million gallons of oils 
and chemicals spilled, leaked or misted into the air, soil and waters 
of North Dakota from 2006 through early October 2014.”12 Another 
more recent report in 2015 indicates that “the spill rate per well 
 
 5.  See infra Parts III–IV. 
 6.  See infra Part V. 
 7.  Id.  
 8.  Id. 
 9.  See QuickFacts: North Dakota, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http:// 
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/38000.html (last visited May 12, 2016). 
 10.  See N.D. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, NORTH DAKOTA REV-E-NEWS 
(2011), https://www.nd.gov/omb/sites/omb/files/documents/newsletters 
/201109news.pdf. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Sontag & Gebeloff, supra note 3. 
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almost tripled between 2004 and 2013. On average, more than two 
gallons of this wastewater spill per minute in North Dakota.”13 Kris 
Roberts, an inspector for the North Dakota Department of Health, 
told one reporter: “We have pipeline leaks, lightning strikes, leaks 
at oil well sites, we have illegal discharges by truckers who do not 
want to wait at saltwater disposal wells . . . . If there’s a way it can 
happen, it probably will.”14 Dave Glatt is the head of the North 
Dakota Department of Health’s Environmental Health Section.15 
Mr. Glatt stated that wastewater spills are his “biggest worry.”16 He 
said, “My concern is, if we don’t get a handle on this, if we don’t 
have appropriate remediation technologies, that we’ll have a 
landscape that is pockmarked with . . . dead zones.”17 
North Dakota regulators have taken heat for their comfortable 
relationship with the oil industry and lack of enforcement.18 Jeff 
Keller, a natural resource manager for the Army Corps of 
Engineers, when asked about enforcement by North Dakota state 
agencies, said “There’s no enforcement . . . . None.”19 
 
 13.  Emily Guerin, In North Dakota, Oilfield Spill Problems Worsen, INSIDE ENERGY 
(Jan. 28, 2015), http://insideenergy.org/2015/01/28/in-north-dakota-oilfield       
-spill-problems-worsen. 
 14.  Emily Guerin, Saltwater Spills Leave North Dakota Farmland Sterile for Years, 
INSIDE ENERGY (Aug. 27, 2014), http://insideenergy.org/2014/08/27/saltwater      
-spills-leave-north-dakota-farmland-sterile-for-years. 
 15.  Department Overview: Environmental Health Section, N.D. DEPT. HEALTH 
[hereinafter Environmental Health Section], https://www.ndhealth.gov/DoH 
/Overview (last visited May 12, 2016). 
 16.  Guerin, supra note 13. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  See Andrew Brown, Landowners from the Oil Patch Believe State Is Bowing to 
Oil Companies, Threaten Litigation, GRAND FORKS HERALD (Dec. 9, 2014), http:// 
www.grandforksherald.com/news-business/landowners-oil-patch-believe-state         
-bowing-oil-companies-threaten-litigation-3631135; Emily Guerin, State Officials 
Misrepresent North Dakota’s Spill Problem, INSIDE ENERGY (Feb. 16, 2015), http:// 
insideenergy.org/2015/02/16/state-officials-misrepresent-north-dakotas-spill         
-problem; Nicholas Kusnetz, North Dakota’s Oil Boom Brings Damage Along with 
Prosperity, PROPUBLICA (June 7, 2012, 9:47 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article 
/the-other-fracking-north-dakotas-oil-boom-brings-damage-along-with-prosperi; 
Deborah Sontag, Where Oil and Politics Mix, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2014), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/24/us/north-dakota-oil-boom-politics 
.html; Tu-Uyen Tran, North Dakota Gets D- in 2015 State Integrity Investigation, 
WDAY6 (Nov. 11, 2015, 6:46 AM), http://www.wday.com/news/3880422-north      
-dakota-gets-d-2015-state-integrity-investigation. 
 19.  Kusnetz, supra note 18. 
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Putting aside a lack of enforcement, landowners are often left 
in the lurch even if there is adequate enforcement of state 
regulations. Karl Rockeman is the Director of the North Dakota 
Department of Health’s Division of Water Quality under the 
Environmental Health Section.20 Mr. Rockeman responded to 
questions about whether the Department of Health’s remediation 
standards protect landowners, and admitted under oath that “[t]he 
department recognizes that our standards are to protect water 
quality and that there may be subsequent damage, loss of 
productivity, [and] other damages to personal property that are 
outside of our scope of authority.”21 The Department of Health 
recently sent out notice of draft remediation guidelines that state 
explicitly: “In order to prevent loss of productivity on agricultural 
lands and subsequent private property damage, lower constituent 
levels may be needed. These levels should be negotiated between 
the landowner and responsible party and are not required by the 
[North Dakota Department of Health].”22 
One of the most surprising aspects of the oil boom, however, is 
that so many of the negative impacts are borne by the owners of the 
surface lands, whose rights are trumped by those of the mineral 
owners.23 From the use of eminent domain for oil pipelines to 
construction of well pads, there are several situations in which a 
surface owner has no right to say “no” to development, and is 
limited to the payment of damages.24 As such, the way the legal 
system views and quantifies the types of damages due to the owners 
of the land’s surface is crucial to developing oil and gas in a 
manner that is just and fair for those living on the land.25 
It is the author’s experience that too often damages to surface 
owners are limited by law, or at times, by the erroneous 
understandings and interpretations of the law advocated by the oil 
and gas industry.26 For example, in some situations, North Dakota 
 
 20.  See Environmental Health Section, supra note 15. 
 21.  Transcript of Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Karl Rockeman, In re Peterson 
v. Ballantyne Oil, No. 20130537 (N.D. Indus. Comm’n Jan. 20, 2015) (on file with 
author). 
 22.  DIV. WATER QUALITY, N.D. DEP’T OF HEALTH, GUIDELINES FOR THE 
ASSESSMENT AND CLEANUP OF SALTWATER RELEASES (DRAFT) (2014) (on file with 
author). 
 23.  See infra Parts III–IV. 
 24.  See infra Parts III–IV. 
 25.  See infra Part V. 
 26.  See, e.g., 1-2 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW   
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law caps damages to real estate at the fair market value of the 
land.27 This leads to a certain mentality in the industry that 
destruction of land is acceptable, so long as market value is paid. 
Thus, an operator may spill saltwater on three acres of land, and if 
similar land previously sold for $750 per acre, the operator simply 
offers $2,250 and considers this fair. What the operator does not 
understand is that the land was not for sale, and worse, the land 
may be sterilized for decades, meaning the farmer will endure a 
loss of productive value that may exceed the fair market value of 
that land. The following sections of this Article will address some of 
the situations in which courts are tasked with determining the 
damages to surface owners, and it will discuss the positive and 
negative aspects of both current law and potential changes to 
current law. 
III. EMINENT DOMAIN: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS RELATED TO JUST 
COMPENSATION 
In eminent domain cases, it is always the situation that the 
landowner is having her land taken against her will. Traditional 
appraisal methodologies often result in a conclusion that there are 
no damages for certain purposes associated with energy 
development, such as electric transmission lines and oil and gas 
pipelines.28 This creates an obvious conflict with the constitutional 
requirement that landowners receive “just compensation” for the 
taking of their land.29 
The infrastructure necessary for oil and gas development was, 
to a great extent, underdeveloped in North Dakota when the boom 
got underway. Certain projects, such as Enbridge’s Sandpiper 
pipeline, Basin Electric Power Cooperative’s recent transmission 
line, and the proposed Dakota Access pipeline, are among the 
types of projects authorized by statute to take land by eminent 
domain under the power of the State.30 While statutory authority 
 
§ 218 (2015). 
 27.  See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-03-09.1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. 
Sess. of the 64th Legis. Assemb.). 
 28.  See, e.g., Thomas O. Jackson & Jennifer M. Pitts, The Effects of Electric 
Transmission Lines on Property Values: A Literature Review, 18 J. REAL EST. LITERATURE 
239 (2010) (concluding that with use of paired sales analysis, transmission lines 
and pipelines often have little to no impact on market values). 
 29.  See, e.g., N.D. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
 30.  See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-15-02 (Westlaw). For further description 
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exists for these projects to use eminent domain, that authority is 
not unassailable.31 Landowners may challenge the use of eminent 
domain for these projects,32 but most eminent domain cases will 
focus on the valuation of the property being taken.33 
This valuation then becomes crucial to assuring that the 
landowner obtains an appropriate remedy for the taking. 
A. The Problem with Standard Appraisal Methodology 
North Dakota law requires that, “[a]s far as practicable, 
compensation must be assessed separately for property actually 
taken and for damages to that which is not taken.”34 This analysis 
becomes difficult to apply in the situation of a partial taking for a 
 
of selected oil and gas development projects, see Antelope Valley Station to Neset 
Transmission Project, BASIN ELECTRIC POWER COOPERATIVE, https:// 
www.basinelectric.com/Projects/North-Dakota-Transmission/index.html (last 
visited May 12, 2016); Overview of the Dakota Access Pipeline, ENERGY TRANSFER, 
http://www.daplpipelinefacts.com/about/overview.html (last visited May 15, 
2016); Sandpiper Pipeline Project, ENBRIDGE, http://www.enbridge.com 
/SandpiperProject.aspx (last visited May 15, 2016). 
 31.  See, e.g., Thompson v. Heineman, 857 N.W.2d 731, 765 (N.D. 2015) 
(citing Tex. Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Tex., LLC, 363 
S.W.3d 192 (Tex. 2012)); Square Butte Elec. Coop. v. Hilken, 244 N.W.2d 519, 523 
(N.D. 1976) (“Where the existence or non-existence of public use is placed in 
issue, the determination, dependent as it is upon the facts and circumstances of 
the matter, is properly a judicial one.”); see also, e.g., Cty. of Haw. v. C & J Coupe 
Family Ltd. P’ship, 198 P.3d 615 (Haw. 2008); Vinegar Bend Lumber Co. v. Oak 
Grove & G.R. Co., 43 So. 292, 294 (Miss. 1907) (“[W]henever an attempt is made 
to take private property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the 
contemplated use be public shall be a judicial question, and, as such, determined 
without regard to legislative assertion that the use is public.”); Middletown Twp. v. 
Lands of Stone, 939 A.2d 331 (Pa. 2007); Tex. Rice Land Partners, 363 S.W.3d at 
194–95 (remanding to trial court after holding that “[a] private enterprise cannot 
acquire unchallengeable condemnation power under [Texas law] merely by 
checking boxes on a one-page form and self-declaring its common-carrier status. 
Merely holding oneself out is insufficient under Texas law to thwart judicial 
review”).  
 32.  See supra note 31. 
 33.  See Paul W. Moomaw, Fire Sale! The Admissibility of Evidence of Environmental 
Contamination to Determine Just Compensation in Washington Eminent Domain 
Proceedings, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1221, 1225 (2001) (citing William B. Stoebuck, Real 
Estate: Property Law, in 17 WASHINGTON PRACTICE, § 9.1 (1995)) (“This portion of 
the proceeding tends to be the most hotly debated: the great majority of eminent 
domain cases focus upon the issue of the proper measure of just compensation.”). 
 34.  N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-15-22(5) (Westlaw). 
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transmission line or pipeline. Responding to this potential 
confusion, the Supreme Court of North Dakota set forth a 
common valuation methodology in Northern States Power Co. v. 
Effertz: 
[I]t would be simpler, less confusing, or in other words 
much more practicable to award compensation upon the 
basis of the damage done to [a] tract . . . to the remainder 
of the farm unit. The damage to the tract, whatever its 
size, would simply be the difference between its 
reasonable market value before the [damage] and its 
reasonable market value thereafter. Such an award would 
give the land owner full compensation without requiring 
the jury to make difficult, confusing and sometimes 
impossible computations.35 
The determination of market value, however, is what creates 
the inadequacy with damages in these situations. The standard 
appraisal methodology, called the comparable sales approach, 
requires the appraiser to find sales of similar properties close in 
time to the subject property and assess the value based on those 
sales.36 Combining this with the methodology described in the 
Effertz case, the methodology is to determine the loss in market 
value based on sales without a similar encumbrance and reduce it 
based on the market value of sales of similar land with a similar 
encumbrance. 
The problem with this methodology becomes clear when real 
estate appraisers start offering opinions in eminent domain cases. 
The standard appraisal methodology often results in a landowner 
receiving little more than nominal compensation, if that.37 Many 
appraisers come to the conclusion that there is no impact on the 
value of the land.38 There are, however, other effective ways for 
landowners to present evidence regarding the just compensation 
they are due when their land is taken, such as offering testimony of 
compensation paid for easements similar to those being taken via 
eminent domain.39 
 
 35.  N. States Power Co. v. Effertz, 94 N.W.2d 288, 294 (N.D. 1958). 
 36.  See, e.g., 60 AM. JUR. Trials § 27 (1996). 
 37.  See, e.g., Jackson & Pitts, supra note 28, at 258 (concluding that, with use 
of paired sales analysis, transmission lines and pipelines often have little to no 
impact on market values). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  See infra Part III. 
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Wyoming is one state that has addressed valuation issues 
explicitly through its eminent domain laws. Under Wyoming law: 
(i) The fair market value of property for which there is a 
relevant market is the price which would be agreed to by 
an informed seller who is willing but not obligated to sell, 
and an informed buyer who is willing but not obligated to 
buy; 
(ii) The fair market value of property for which there is 
no relevant market is its value as determined by any 
method of valuation that is just and equitable; 
(iii) The determination of fair market value shall use 
generally accepted appraisal techniques and may include: 
(A) The value determined by appraisal of the 
property performed by a certified appraiser; 
(B) The price paid for other comparable easements or leases 
of comparable type, size and location on the same or similar 
property; 
(C) Values paid for transactions of comparable type, size 
and location by other public or private entities in arms length 
transactions for comparable transactions on the same or 
similar property.40 
Commenting specifically on the provision that allows for 
evidence of comparable easements, the Supreme Court of 
Wyoming recognized: 
[I]n some cases a partial taking may not reduce the value 
of the remaining property, at least according to some 
generally accepted appraisal techniques. By offering an 
alternative method for measuring just compensation 
when there is a partial taking which does not result in a 
reduction in value of the remaining property, the 
legislature assured a property owner would at least receive 
compensation for the value of the land taken.41 
While North Dakota’s eminent domain laws are not as specific 
as Wyoming’s, they do allow for the same type of evidence.42 North 
Dakota law states, inter alia, that 
 
 40.  WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-704 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Gen. Sess.) 
(emphasis added). 
 41.  Barlow Ranch, Ltd. P’ship v. Greencore Pipeline Co., 301 P.3d 75, 84–85 
(2013). 
 42.  Compare WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-704 (Westlaw), with N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. § 32-15-22 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. of the 64th Legis. 
Assemb.). 
9
Braaten: This Land Is Not for Sale
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2016
2. Braaten_FF4 (1034-1067) (Do Not Delete) 6/24/2016  11:22 AM 
2016] THIS LAND IS NOT FOR SALE 1043 
[t]he jury, or court, or referee, if a jury is waived, must 
hear such legal testimony as may be offered by any of the 
parties to the proceedings and thereupon must ascertain 
and assess[] the value of the property sought to be 
condemned and all improvements thereon pertaining to 
the realty and of each and every separate estate or interest 
therein. If it consists of different parcels, the value of each 
parcel and each estate and interest therein shall be 
separately assessed.43 
An easement can be construed as “the . . . property sought to 
be condemned” and can also be subsumed by the language 
referring to “each estate and interest therein.”44 North Dakota’s 
pattern jury instruction for damage valuation in an eminent 
domain case provides additional support for this position. It states 
that “[j]ust compensation for the property actually taken is the fair 
market value of that property . . . .”45 “‘Fair market value’ is the 
highest price for which the property can be sold in the open 
market by a willing seller to a willing purchaser, neither party 
acting under compulsion and both exercising reasonable 
judgment.”46 Wyoming, for example, has recognized in its statutes 
that the fair market value of other similar easements is one of the 
best indicators of the fair market value of an easement being taken 
through eminent domain proceedings.47 The pattern jury 
instruction from North Dakota also makes it clear that “[t]he 
determination of value in a condemnation proceeding is not a 
matter of a formula or artificial rules, but of sound judgment and 
discretion based upon [the juror’s] consideration of all the 
relevant facts in a particular case.”48 
Despite the language in North Dakota’s law and that of the 
pattern jury instruction, the author’s experience is that operators 
will argue that other easements are not competent evidence.49 
While these arguments have not always prevailed,50 it would be 
 
 43.  N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-15-22(1) (Westlaw). 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  STATE BAR ASS’N OF N.D., NORTH DAKOTA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS no. 
75.05 (2014) [hereinafter N.D. JURY INSTRUCTIONS], https://www.sband.org 
/UserFiles/files/pdfs/patternjuryinstruction/2014PatternJuryCivl.pdf. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-704(a)(iii)(B) (Westlaw). 
 48.  N.D. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 45, at no. 75.05. 
 49.  See infra notes 56–59, 77–82 and accompanying text. 
 50.  See infra Section III.B. In the Basin Electric v. Wayne Hauge proceedings, 
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beneficial for landowners if the North Dakota Legislative Assembly 
amended its eminent domain laws in the explicit manner that was 
accomplished in Wyoming. The Wyoming statute recognizes what 
many would consider common sense: If you want to know that 
market value of an easement being taken by eminent domain, the 
best evidence is consideration of other similar easements actually 
bought on the open market. 
B. Evidentiary Challenges to Eminent Domain Valuations: The Story of 
Botsford and Basin Electric Power Cooperative 
Specific examples of evidentiary challenges by condemnors 
illuminate why it is helpful for eminent domain valuation laws to be 
as explicit as in Wyoming. 
1. North Dakota Pipeline Company v. James and Krista 
Botsford: Under North Dakota Law, Easement Offers from the 
Condemnor Should Be Admissible 
In a recent high-profile case in North Dakota, North Dakota 
Pipeline Co., LLC v. Botsford, the North Dakota Pipeline Company 
(NDPC) sought to condemn an easement over the Botsfords’ 
property for an oil pipeline.51 The dispute arose from the 
Botsfords’ refusal to grant an easement over their land for NDPC’s 
Sandpiper pipeline.52 
According to one report, the Botsfords refused to grant the 
easement because they “did not want to participate in a private 
enterprise that would increase global warming and threaten the 
lives of [their] heirs. This was a moral imperative . . . .”53 After Mr. 
Botsford suggested to a company representative that they go 
around his property, he said that the representative responded, 
 
Judge Rustad allowed evidence of other easements to come into evidence. See infra 
notes 73–77 and accompanying text. 
 51.  N.D. Pipeline Co. LLC v. Botsford et al., No. 18-2014-CV-01058 (N.D. 
Dist. Ct. Dec. 23, 2015), cert. granted, No. 20160017 (N.D. Jan. 1, 2016). 
 52.  NDPC is a joint venture between Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. and 
Williston Basin Pipe Line LLC, an indirect subsidiary of Marathon Petroleum 
Corporation. See Sandpaper Pipeline Project, ENBRIDGE, http://www.enbridge.com 
/SandpiperProject.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 2016); see also Georgianne Nienaber, 
Farmer Won’t Sell Easement So Enbridge Oil Is Suing, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 8, 2015, 
8:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/georgianne-nienaber/farmer-wont       
-sell-family-f_b_7960084.html. 
 53.  Nienaber, supra note 52. 
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“Enbridge [doesn’t] go around anything—they go through it.”54 In 
the end, NDPC was granted the right to exercise eminent domain 
and a trial was held on the issue of just compensation.55 
NDPC had made an offer to the Botsfords for the easement 
and the Botsfords sought to introduce the offer at trial.56 NDPC 
argued that its offer for the easement should be excluded as 
evidence under rule 408 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence,57 
which prohibits introduction of offers of compromise as evidence.58 
NDPC argued as follows: 
Evidence of pre-condemnation offers is not admissible to 
prove just compensation at trial. North Dakota Rule of 
Evidence 408, subdivision (a)(l), bars evidence that a 
party offered “valuable consideration in . . . attempting to 
compromise” a claim, if the evidence is offered “to prove  
. . . the amount of a disputed claim.” Similarly, “conduct 
[and] statement[s] made during compromise 
negotiations” cannot be offered to prove or disprove the 
validity of an amount in controversy. “The policy 
underlying this rule is the furtherance of compromise and 
settlement of disputes among parties.” It reflects a 
determination that “open and effective discussions of 
compromise” are only possible where “the parties know in 
advance that they will not jeopardize their case by fully 
 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  See Botsford, No. 18-2014-CV-01058. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  North Dakota Rule of Evidence 408 states: 
(a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible, on 
behalf of any party, either to prove or disprove the validity or amount 
of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or 
a contradiction: 
(1) furnishing, promising, offering, accepting, promising to 
accept, or offering to accept a valuable consideration in 
compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and 
(2) conduct or a statement made during compromise 
negotiations. 
(b) Exceptions. The court may admit this evidence for another 
purpose, such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice, negating a 
contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal 
investigation or prosecution. The court need not exclude evidence 
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of 
compromise negotiations. 
N.D. R. EVID. 408. 
 58.  See Botsford, No. 18-2014-CV-01058. 
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discussing all aspects of a claim.” NDPC’s pre-litigation 
offer was intended to obtain an easement in the Botsfords 
fee property without resorting to litigation. The 
declarations contained in the offer constitute “conduct” 
and “statements” made during compromise negotiations; 
they are, therefore, inadmissible. Furthermore, under 
North Dakota law, offers of compromise made before the 
filing of an action are still barred by Rule 408. Therefore, 
it is of no legal consequence that the offer predated 
initiation of the condemnation proceedings.59 
The Botsfords responded, arguing that NDPC’s offer to the 
Botsfords is not an “offer to compromise” that is covered by Rule 
408.60 Although NDPC referred to its offer as an “offer to 
compromise,” it failed to address the specifics of the actual offer, as 
well as the specific legal context in which the offer was made, both 
of which show that it was not, indeed, an offer to compromise. 
It is illuminating to examine the actual easement offer that 
NDPC sought to exclude. It stated: “NDPL hereby offers to you the 
amount of Thirty Eight Thousand Sixty Two dollars ($38,062.00) as 
full monetary compensation for the easement and workspace land 
value.”61 The offer also indicates that it is an “offer to purchase an 
easement.”62 On the third page of the offer, it lists the documents 
enclosed, one of which is titled “Grand Forks County Market 
Analysis Summary.”63 Below the listed item, it explains, “This 
Market Analysis Summary is enclosed to support the valuation as it was 
applied to your property, and is for your review.”64 
NDPC cited to McCormick on Evidence, section 274, in support 
of its position, but in its argument it left out a much more 
important and pertinent part of the discussion from that treatise. 
As stated in that treatise: 
 
 59.  Id.; Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence, Botsford, No.        
18-2014-CV-01058, Doc No. 106 (on file with the author) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted); Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine, Botsford, No. 
18-2014-CV-01058, Doc No. 107 (on file with the author) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
 60.  See Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine, Botsford, No.  
18-2014-CV-01058, Doc No. 109 (on file with author). 
 61.  See Exhibit A to Affidavit of Derrick Braaten, Botsford, No. 18-2014-CV-
01058, Doc No. 111 [hereinafter Exhibit A] (on file with the author) (emphasis 
added). 
 62.  See id. (emphasis added). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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To call into play the exclusionary rule, there must be an 
actual dispute, or at least an apparent difference of view 
between the parties as to the validity or amount of the 
claim. An offer to pay an admitted claim is not privileged. 
There is no policy of encouraging compromises of 
undisputed claims. They should be paid in full.65 
There was no question that NDPC was required to pay just 
compensation to the Botsfords in the condemnation proceeding.66 
The fact that the Botsfords were attempting to submit NDPC’s offer 
as evidence makes it clear that the Botsfords did not dispute that 
the amount offered was sufficient to evidence just compensation 
for the easement. Therefore, the claim was undisputed, and should 
have been paid in full as per NDPC’s offer of just compensation, 
and the exclusionary rule cited by NDPC is inapplicable. 
Further, the mandate of North Dakota Century Code section 
32-15-06.1 cannot be ignored. This section first requires the 
following: “Before initiating negotiations for the purchase of 
property, the condemnor shall establish an amount which it 
believes to be just compensation therefor and promptly shall 
submit to the owner an offer to acquire the property for the full 
amount so established.”67 Additionally, “[t]he condemnor shall 
provide the owner of the property with . . . a written statement and 
summary, showing the basis for the amount it established as just 
compensation for the property.”68 NDPC’s offer indicated that it 
was intended to comply with this mandate.69 After indicating the 
amount of the offer, NDPC explained that “[t]he enclosed 
Calculation Sheet and Statement of Value and Summary explain 
how this amount was determined.”70 Included with the offer was 
NDPC’s “Grand Forks County Market Analysis Summary,” which 
NDPC explained to the Botsfords was a “Market Analysis Summary  
. . . [which] support[s] the valuation as it was applied to your 
 
 65.  MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 274 (2d ed. 1972); accord MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE § 266 (7th ed. 2013). 
 66.  See N.D. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“Private property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compensation having been first made to . . . 
the owner.”).  
 67.  N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-15-06.1(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. 
Sess. of the 64th Legis. Assemb.). 
 68.  Id. § 32-15-06.1(4).  
 69.  See Exhibit A, supra note 61. 
 70.  Id. 
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property . . . .”71 As is required by section 32-15-06.1(2), NDPC 
established through its analysis what it believed to be “just 
compensation,” and then forwarded this offer to the Botsfords. 
Therefore, there was no better evidence of “[t]he value of the 
property sought to be condemned”72—in this case, an easement 
over the Botsford’s land. 
The requirement that a condemnor determine what it believes 
to be “just compensation” should not be an idle act. If a 
condemnor follows the dictate of this law, then there is no question 
that its original offer based on its determination should be the 
floor for establishing just compensation for the taking. 
2. Basin Electric Power Cooperative v. Wayne Hauge: 
Easement Offers from Third Parties Should Be Admissible 
a. Easement Offers Are Competent Evidence of Market Value 
Another challenge to traditional appraisal methodology in 
North Dakota recently came in Basin Electric Power Cooperative v. 
Wayne Hauge.73 Basin Electric Power Cooperative (Basin) filed an 
action to condemn an easement for an electric transmission line 
across Mr. Hauge’s property.74 Mr. Hauge’s resistance to the taking 
was based on the fact that the land over which Basin wanted an 
easement was his family’s homestead, and he had made a decision 
to never allow another easement on that land.75 Nonetheless, Basin 
was allowed to take an easement via eminent domain authority, and 
Mr. Hauge found himself at a trial regarding just compensation for 
the taking.76 One of the issues at the trial, however, was whether Mr. 
Hauge could offer testimony regarding other easements he had 
negotiated on his land.77 As was argued, no one knows the land 
better than the landowner himself.78 
 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-15-22(1) (Westlaw). 
 73.  No. 53-2014-CV-00695 (N.D. Dist. Ct. Feb. 9, 2016) (on file with author). 
 74.  Id.  
 75.  Id.; see also Derrick Braaten, AgVocate: Our Land Is Not for Sale, AGWEEK 
(Dec. 9, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.agweek.com/columns/derrick-braaten 
/3898104-agvocate-our-land-not-sale. 
 76.  Hauge, No. 53-2014-CV-00695.  
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
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Mr. Hauge intended to submit other easement offers as 
evidence of the market value for the easement Basin sought to take, 
and Basin objected that in the other transactions, the company 
buying the pipeline easement was not a “willing buyer.”79 The court 
allowed Mr. Hauge to testify as to the value of the other easements, 
and Basin was allowed to cross-examine and produce its own 
evidence in rebuttal.80 An appraiser hired by Basin testified that 
when a company is seeking an easement for a pipeline or 
transmission line route, the company is limited to a linear corridor 
and therefore is not a willing buyer.81 On cross-examination, 
however, the appraiser admitted that the company was the one who 
chose the route, and was able to deviate from the route if it so 
chose.82 In the end, the issue of whether a company in another 
transaction was or was not a willing buyer is a fact issue, the 
determination of which should be made by the fact-finder. 
b. Landowner Testimony Regarding Market Value Is Subject to 
Cross-Examination, But Should Not Be Excluded Based on 
Foundation 
Landowners are given significant latitude in North Dakota to 
testify on the issue of valuation of real property. “The general rule 
is that an owner of property may testify without qualification other 
than the fact of ownership as to its value.”83 This rule holds true not 
only in North Dakota, but in numerous other jurisdictions.84 This is 
an exception to the rule that lay witnesses typically may not offer 
opinion testimony.85 While not controlling precedent in all 
jurisdictions, in response to the apparent concerns of condemnors 
who might object to such lay opinion testimony, the Supreme 
 
 79.  Id. The proceedings were held on record in the chambers of Judge 
Joshua B. Rustad. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. (citing the testimony of Joe Ibach in open court). 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Pfliger v. Peavey Co., 310 N.W.2d 742, 747 (N.D. 1981). 
 84.  See, e.g., 3 FRED LANE, LANE GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE § 16:17 (3d ed. 
2015) (detailing cases from numerous jurisdictions where such opinion testimony 
was allowed). 
 85.  See generally J.E. Macy, Annotation, Competency of a Witness to Give Expert 
Opinion Testimony as to Value of Real Property, 159 A.L.R. 7 (1946); see also N.D. R. 
EVID. 701. Other jurisdictions’ Rule 701 also regulate opinion testimony by lay 
witnesses. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 701; MINN. R. EVID. 701. 
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Court of Arkansas offered a helpful and concise explanation of the 
rule: 
Of course, such opinion testimony, either by the 
landowner or his value witnesses, may be stricken on 
motion if there is no fair or logical basis for its support. 
Once the landowner or his qualified expert witness has 
expressed into evidence his opinion as to fair market 
values, the burden then shifts to the condemnor to show 
by cross-examination that the landowner or the witnesses 
has no logical basis to support his opinion before such 
testimony is subject to being stricken from the record on 
motion. If on cross-examination, the condemnor is unable 
to draw from the landowner or his expert witness more 
than a weak or questionable basis for his opinion, that fact 
has a bearing on the weight to be given the testimony by 
the jury, and the testimony should not be stricken on 
motion.86 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has stated that the 
“liberal rule that permits an owner to testify concerning the value 
of his property is based upon a presumed familiarity with the 
subject, acquired from having purchased it or from having gained a 
knowledge in some other way, sufficient to qualify him.”87 
C. Courts Should Continue Liberally Applying the Landowner Testimony 
Rule Based Upon the Landowner’s Presumed Familiarity with the 
Land and Its Value 
Although North Dakota and other jurisdictions have liberal 
rules that allow landowners to testify as to the value of their own 
property, there will always be condemnors and other parties who 
will attempt to restrict that testimony as much as possible, as 
exemplified by the arguments made by NDPC and Basin. As the 
Wyoming Legislature explicitly recognized, however, there are 
times when the typical appraisal methodology of looking at the 
parcel of land before and after the hypothetical easement results in 
nominal or no compensation for the landowner.88 Indeed, North 
 
 86.  Ark. State Highway Comm’n v. Jones, 505 S.W.2d 210, 211–12 (Ark. 
1974) (citations omitted). 
 87.  Alm Constr. Co. v. Vertin, 118 N.W.2d 737, 748 (N.D. 1962) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 88.  See N. States Power Co. v. Effertz, 94 N.W.2d 288, 294 (N.D. 1958); 60 AM. 
JUR. Trials, supra note 36. 
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Dakota’s Constitution, like many other state constitutions, states 
that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation having been first made to, or paid 
into court for the owner . . . .”89 It is simply not possible for just 
compensation to be “first made to [the landowner] or paid into 
court” if the condemnor’s appraiser is correct that there is no loss 
to the value of the land, and therefore no payment whatsoever to 
make to the landowner or deposit with the court. As such, the 
courts need to recognize a liberal rule allowing landowners to 
testify, especially considering that the landowners are typically 
being sued by large entities who can afford to hire expensive 
appraisers, which was the case in Basin Electric. 
IV. DAMAGES TO REAL ESTATE: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS RELATED 
TO ADEQUATE COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM OIL AND 
GAS DEVELOPMENT 
There are also problems with valuation of damages to real 
estate outside of the eminent domain context, specifically because 
the concept of diminution in market value is still pertinent to these 
valuations. Although there is a separate body of case law and 
different laws that apply, the energy industry applies the same 
reasoning to the damage it causes outside of the context of 
eminent domain. 
In North Dakota and in some other states, practitioners in the 
oil and gas industry typically distinguish between expected damages 
from construction of well pads and access roads, and other 
unanticipated damages from, for example, oil and saltwater spills.90 
As will be explained, oil and gas operators typically have certain 
rights to use of the surface, and that use only gives rise to damages 
when a statute creates the right for damages.91 On the other hand, 
if the use of the land goes beyond the rights of the operator to use 
 
 89.  N.D. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
 90.  See generally Kartch v. EOG Res., Inc., No. 4:10-cv-014, 2010 WL 4260103, 
at *1 (D.N.D. Oct. 22, 2010). The court in this case explained that prior to 
adoption of the compensation statute, surface owners did not have an accepted 
right to compensation for reasonable use of the surface. Id. at *2. The implied 
conclusion as recognized by other courts is that a use beyond that which is 
reasonably necessary will give rise to an action for damages. See Getty Oil Co. v. 
Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex. 1971). 
 91.  Kartch, 2010 WL 4260103, at *1.  
18
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol42/iss4/2
2. Braaten_FF4 (1034-1067) (Do Not Delete) 6/24/2016  11:22 AM 
1052 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1034 
the surface for production, such as with a spill, then common law 
actions are available.92 
A. The Split Estate and the Implied Easement 
To understand the interplay between these different categories 
of damages and corresponding rights, it is necessary to understand 
the nature of the split estate. A split estate refers to a situation in 
which the owner of the surface of land is different than the owner 
of the minerals.93 The mineral estate is dominant over the surface 
estate, and the mineral estate affords its owner an implied servitude 
for access to and use of the surface estate.94 Additionally, the 
granting of an oil and gas lease by a mineral owner gives the lessee 
under such a lease these same rights.95 
Whether the express uses are set out or not, the mere 
granting of the lease creates and vests in the lessee the 
dominant estate in the surface of the land for the 
purposes of the lease; by implication it grants the lessee 
the use of the surface to the extent necessary to a full 
enjoyment of the grant.96 
Landowners in North Dakota and their attorneys are faced 
with myriad issues when the fee simple absolute estate is severed, 
particularly with respect to minerals such as oil and gas. The fee 
simple estate can be split by a reservation of minerals in a deed or 
other conveyance, or by a grant of any or all of the minerals 
underlying the surface estate.97 “Minerals in place are land, and 
may be conveyed as other lands are conveyed.”98 “After severance, 
the surface and minerals are held by separate and distinct titles in 
severalty, and each is a freehold estate of inheritance.”99 
 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  For further explanation of the split estate, see Split Estate, BUREAU       
LAND MGMT., http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/energy/oil_and_gas/best 
_management_practices/split_estate.html (last visited May 15, 2016). 
 94.  Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 135 (N.D. 1979) (“[T]he 
surface estate is servient in the sense it is charged with the servitude for those 
essential rights of the mineral estate.”); see also Christina v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 
543, 550 (N.D. 1973) (describing the attendant rights of the owner of a surface 
estate and those of a mineral owner). 
 95.  Feland v. Placid Oil Co., 171 N.W.2d 829, 834 (N.D. 1969). 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  See Beulah Coal Mining Co. v. Heihn, 180 N.W. 787, 789 (N.D. 1920). 
 98.  Id.  
 99.  Bilby v. Wire, 77 N.W.2d 882, 886 (N.D. 1956) (internal quotations 
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Different strata and different minerals may be severed 
separately.100 The most common situation in the North Dakota oil 
patch is a split estate involving one person who owns the surface 
estate, and one or more others who own the mineral rights 
underlying that surface estate.101 Landowners and their lawyers 
must understand the basic rights that belong to the owner of the 
surface estate and the owner of the mineral estate. 
The rights granted to the dominant estate owner are limited: 
“[T]he rights of the owner of the mineral estate are limited to so 
much of the surface and such use thereof as are [r]easonably 
necessary to explore, develop, and transport the materials.”102 
In Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, the seminal case regarding the rights of 
the mineral owner in a split estate situation, the Texas Supreme 
Court explained the concept of due regard, and adopted what has 
come to be known as the “accommodation doctrine.”103 Essentially, 
the accommodation doctrine requires due regard for the surface 
 
omitted). 
 100.  See, e.g., Beulah Coal Mining, 180 N.W. at 787. 
 101.  See, e.g., Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 135 (N.D. 1979); 
Beulah Coal Mining, 180 N.W. at 787.  
 102.  Hunt Oil Co., 283 N.W.2d at 135; see also Union Producing Co. v. Pittman, 
146 So.2d 553, 555 (Miss. 1962) (citation omitted) (“[A] grant or reservation of 
mines or minerals gives to the mineral owner the incidental right of entering, 
occupying, and making such use of the surface lands as is reasonably necessary in 
exploring, mining, removing, and marketing the minerals.”). According to the 
Union Producing court:  
[T]he question of what is a reasonable use of the premises is a question 
of fact, and although the drilling operator may use as much of the 
surface as may be reasonably necessary, he cannot be unreasonable in 
the use of such land, nor oppressive or capricious in its use. The owner 
of the minerals may do what is reasonably necessary to recover 
minerals, but the mineral owner or agent is not the final judge as to 
what is reasonably necessary. This is a question of fact for the 
determination of the jury. 
Union Producing Co., 146 So.2d at 555–56; see also Hunt Oil Co., 283 N.W.2d at 137 
(citations omitted) (“Whether or not the use of the surface estate by the mineral 
estate owner is reasonably necessary is a question of fact for the trier of facts.”). 
Further informing the determination of reasonable use of the surface is “the 
concept that the owner of the mineral estate must have due regard for the rights 
of the surface owner and is required to exercise that degree of care and use which 
is a just consideration for the rights of the surface owner.” Hunt Oil Co., 283 
N.W.2d at 135 (citations omitted). 
 103.  470 S.W.2d at 622–23; see also WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 26.  
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owner and his use of the property.104 While the mineral owner may 
have the right to do what is reasonably necessary to obtain 
production of the minerals, if there are alternatives available to the 
mineral developer, some of which harm the surface use, and some 
which do not, the mineral developer generally must utilize the 
alternative that does not disrupt the surface use.105 
Jurisdictions vary in the degree to which they apply the 
concept of “due regard” or “reasonable accommodation,” more 
frequently known as the “accommodation doctrine.” Prior to the 
Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Getty Oil, Texas followed the 
unidimensional “reasonably necessary” test.106 Many states, 
including North Dakota, have now adopted the accommodation 
doctrine.107 A closer look at the language in Hunt Oil helps shed 
light on the position North Dakota has taken regarding the 
accommodation doctrine: 
We agree a pure balancing test is not involved under the 
accommodation doctrine where no reasonable 
alternatives are available. Where alternatives do exist, 
however, the concepts of due regard and reasonable 
necessity do require a weighing of the different alternatives 
against the inconveniences to the surface owner. Therefore, 
once alternatives are shown to exist a balancing of the 
mineral and surface owner’s interest does occur.108 
 
 104.  470 S.W.2d at 622. 
 105.  Id. (internal citations omitted) (“The due regard concept defines more 
fully what is to be considered in the determination of whether a surface use by the 
lessee is reasonably necessary. There may be only one manner of use of the surface 
whereby the minerals can be produced. The lessee has the right to pursue this use, 
regardless of surface damage. And there may be necessitous temporary use 
governed by the same principle. But under the circumstances indicated here (i.e., 
where there is an existing use by the surface owner which would otherwise be 
precluded or impaired) and where under the established practices in the industry 
there are alternatives available to the lessee whereby the minerals can be 
recovered, the rules of reasonable usage of the surface may require the adoption 
of an alternative by the lessee.”). 
 106.  See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 26 (“Excessive user has been found by 
reason of . . . occupation of more of the surface than was reasonably necessary for 
the full enjoyment of the minerals . . . .” (citation omitted)).  
 107.  Id.; see also Hunt Oil Co., 283 N.W.2d 131 at 137 (applying the 
accommodation doctrine).  
 108.  Hunt Oil Co., 283 N.W.2d 131 at 137 (citing Getty Oil Co., 470 S.W.2d at 
623) (emphasis added). The court also noted: 
It is important to note that the Texas Supreme Court in Getty 
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Thus, the North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with Texas 
insofar as it did not adopt a pure balancing test, but it went further 
than the Getty Oil court. Specifically, the court held by that, where 
alternatives exist, there is a balancing that takes place between the 
potential alternatives to the developer and the inconveniences to 
the surface owner.109 
B. Damages Arising from Well Site and Infrastructure Development 
1. Compensation Statutes and North Dakota’s Surface Damages Act 
Pursuant to the common law discussed above, there was also 
no legal requirement for a mineral developer to pay damages to 
the surface owner if its use of the surface fell within its rights under 
the implied easement. Prior to the adoption of certain statutes in 
many of the oil-producing states, “[t]he rights of the surface owner 
were perceived as being limited to seeking relief in tort if the 
mineral owners [sic] use of the surface was unreasonable or 
negligent.”110 
 
concluded the accommodation doctrine is not a balancing type test 
weighing the harm or inconvenience to the owner of one type of 
interest against the benefit to the other. Rather the court said the test 
is the availability of alternative non-conflicting uses of the two types of 
owners. Inconvenience to the surface owner is not the controlling 
element where no reasonable alternatives are available to the mineral 
owner or lessee. The surface owner must show that under the 
circumstances, the use of the surface under attack is not reasonably 
necessary. 
Id.  
 109.  Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness, 946 P.2d 913, 927 (Colo. 1997). 
The fact that neither the surface owner nor the severed mineral rights 
holder has any absolute right to exclude the other from the surface 
may create tension between competing surface uses. “The broad 
principle by which these tensions are to be resolved is that each owner 
must have due regard for the rights of the other in making use of the 
estate in question.” This “due regard” concept requires mineral rights 
holders to accommodate surface owners to the fullest extent possible 
consistent with their right to develop the mineral estate. 
Id. (citing Grynberg v. City of Northglenn, 739 P.2d 230, 234 (Colo. 1987)) 
 110.  Order Denying Motion to Strike Jury Demand, Kartch v. EOG Res., Inc., 
No. 4:10-cv-014 (D.N.D. Oct. 22, 2010), 2010 WL 4260103 at *2 (citing Murphy v. 
Amoco Prod. Co., 729 F.2d 552, 554–56, 555 n.3 (8th Cir. 1984); Hunt Oil Co., 283 
N.W.2d at 135 n.4). 
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Due to the perceived inequities of this situation, many states 
have passed surface damage compensation acts requiring 
compensation even if the mineral owner has an implied easement 
or an express lease. North Dakota passed the Oil and Gas 
Production Damage Compensation Act (Surface Damage Act), 
which provided, inter alia, a requirement that mineral developers 
compensate surface estate owners for damage arising from 
construction of well pads and access roads.111 The “purpose of [the 
Surface Damage Act] is to provide the maximum amount of 
constitutionally permissible protection to surface owners and other 
persons from the undesirable effects of development of 
minerals.”112 The primary provisions of the Surface Damage Act 
provide various requirements for mineral developers to apprise 
surface owners of anticipated activities, and most importantly, to 
pay damages for damage to the surface estate arising from drilling 
and production operations.113 
Although litigation in the state district courts is frequent, there 
are only a handful of reported decisions on the Surface Damage 
Act in North Dakota. One case brought pursuant to this statute, 
Kartch v. EOG Resources, Inc., was the subject of a summary judgment 
decision in the U.S. District Court for the District of North 
Dakota.114 The court ruled on several damage items in a manner 
inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the Surface Damage 
Act. 
In Kartch, the court considered claims for “(1) excessive noise; 
(2) contamination of soil and water; (3) diminished air quality, use 
of flare, and excessive odors; (4) excessive litter; and (5) storage of 
unnecessary equipment.”115 
With respect to the excessive noise, the surface owner testified: 
I can hear that generator running in my home with the 
windows closed. I can hear that generator running 
virtually—I can hear the generator running from every 
corner of any piece of property I own there. It appears to 
 
 111.  See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. ch. 38-11.1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. 
Sess. of the 64th Legis. Assemb.). 
 112.  Id. § 38-11.1-02. 
 113.  See generally id. § 38-11.1-01 through -10. 
 114.  Order Denying Motion to Strike Jury Demand, supra note 110. 
 115.  Kartch v. EOG Res., Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1009 (D.N.D. Feb. 29, 
2012). 
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run consistently. It is very loud. And it prevents enjoyment 
of my property. 
. . . . 
It disrupts my ability to sleep. It disrupts my ability to 
recreate or enjoy or work on my property. It constantly 
runs.116 
The U.S. District Court addressed the surface owners’ 
complaints, stating that 
[w]hile the Kartches complain that the noise produced by 
the generator is excessive and hinders their ability to 
enjoy the property, they do not claim that the noise is 
inordinate or exceeds the normal level of noise created by 
generators on active oil wells in North Dakota. A certain 
amount of noise is inevitable in oil production.117 
Similarly, with respect to the flare on the property, the court 
simply stated that such flaring is customary in the oil industry in 
North Dakota and is therefore not a nuisance.118 
The court also found that “[t]he litter of which the Kartches 
complain does not appear to be a persistent problem, nor does it 
cause the unsanitary conditions that rise to the level of a nuisance,” 
and that “as a matter of law, that ‘run-of-the-mill litter’ at the well 
site d[id] not constitute a nuisance under North Dakota law.”119 
Finally, the court found that equipment stored at the well site also 
did not constitute a nuisance.120 This conclusion fails to 
acknowledge the specific purpose of the Surface Damage Act. 
While the court recognized that the Kartches’ pleadings 
disclosed nuisance claims, it also recognized that these claims were 
made pursuant to and were subsumed under the Surface Damage 
Act.121 The court noted that “[i]t is clear that mineral developers 
are responsible for damages ‘resulting from a nuisance caused by 
drilling operations.’”122 
The district court’s analysis is not entirely inconsistent with 
nuisance law in North Dakota, but its analysis fails to take into 
account the need for interpreting a nuisance through the lens of 
 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. at 1010. 
 118.  Id. at 1011. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 1012. 
 121.  Id. at 1008–09. 
 122.  Id. at 1008 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-11.1-06) (Westlaw)). 
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the Surface Damage Act. In other words, a nuisance within the 
context of damages alleged pursuant to the Surface Damage Act 
should be analyzed differently than a nuisance claim unrelated to 
oil and gas drilling and production operations. The North Dakota 
Attorney General referred to testimony about the Surface Damage 
Act in a 2007 opinion: 
[The oil and gas company] usually but not always . . . 
makes a one time offer to the surface owner for actual 
surface damage. In the event of a dry hole the 
compensation may be fair . . . but in the event of 
production, which may be for 20 or 30 years of [sic] more, 
the surface owner gets no consideration unless the 
producer volunteers or the surface owner has to sue in 
each instance and prove his claim . . . . We are reluctant to 
be operating under present practices where the surface 
owner has to sue in every instance where he feels he has 
been damaged, and must prove his claim . . . . The trouble 
with a one time settlement is that there is no way to 
determine years in advance what actual damage, let alone 
intangible damages might be. For instance, odor in the air, 
management practices, working around oil equipment, danger to 
health of humans and livestock, loss of water wells and springs. 
Then too, salt and oil spills, corrosion on metal buildings, 
machinery and wire by hydrogen sulfide gas, loss of use of surface, 
cattle passes, roads, pipelines and traffic, flair [sic] outs, fires, 
pollution, trespassing and depreciated value of surface.123 
These were precisely the type of damages alleged by the 
surface owners in Kartch, and the Surface Damage Act should not 
be interpreted to have the same constraints as a common law 
nuisance claim. 
The interpretation of the district court in Kartch fails to 
acknowledge that the Surface Damage Act was intended to 
compensate surface owners for precisely the types of damages the 
court disallowed. By ruling that the noise from EOG’s generator 
was not a nuisance because the noise did not “exceed[] the normal 
level of noise created by generators on active oil wells in North 
Dakota,”124 the court frustrated the intent of the North Dakota 
Legislative Assembly. The Assembly recognized that oil and gas 
 
 123.  Letter from Wayne Stenehjem, N.D. Att’y Gen., to Lynn D. Helms, Dir., 
Oil & Gas Div., N.D. Indus. Comm’n, 2007 WL 780365, at *2 (Mar. 13, 2007) 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted) (statement of Rep. Murphy). 
 124.  Kartch, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 1009. 
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production brings additional noise, gas flares can be loud and 
often emit a noxious smell, and that additional traffic servicing the 
oil field can be a nuisance to the people living in the oilfield, and it 
intended that they be compensated for these things.125 To limit 
recovery because such nuisances are common in the oilfield misses 
the point. The only limits the Assembly intended to allow to the 
damages a surface owner can recover are constitutional limits.126 
2. Unforeseen Environmental Damages 
Although most claims related to oilfield damages are 
encompassed by North Dakota Century Code chapter 38-11.1, some 
of the extraordinary damages occasioned by pipeline ruptures and 
well blowouts can also be brought under different legal theories, 
such as trespass. There is a common restriction on damages to real 
estate, however, which typically limits damages for restoration of 
the property when those damages exceed the diminution in the fair 
market value of the property.127 As previously discussed, this rule 
creates a warped perspective for operators in which the only 
ramification of destroying land is to pay its market value based on 
past agricultural sales, even when the land was not for sale.128 
a. Some Jurisdictions Have Recognized the Problem with a Fair 
Market Value Cap and Adjusted Accordingly 
Some courts have changed their thinking on damages to real 
property arising from oil and gas production, doing away with a 
concrete restriction on restoration damages. For example, in 
Ruffatto v. EOG Resources, Inc., a federal district court in Montana 
applied the diminution in value damage cap to a surface damage 
act substantially similar to North Dakota’s.129 The Ruffatto opinion, 
 
 125.  Supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 126.  N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-11.1-02 (Westlaw) (“It is the purpose of this 
chapter to provide the maximum amount of constitutionally permissible protection to 
surface owners and other persons from the undesirable effects of development of 
minerals. This chapter is to be interpreted in light of the legislative intent 
expressed herein.” (emphasis added)). 
 127.  See, e.g., id. § 32-03-09.1. 
 128.  See supra Part III. While there may be other ramifications related to the 
regulatory authorities, such ramifications are not necessarily focused on making 
the landowner whole. 
 129.  Ruffatto v. EOG Res., Inc., CV-06-32-BLG-RFC, at 4 (D. Mont. Dec. 7, 
2007) (on file with author); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10 et seq. (West, Westlaw 
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however, invoked a now outdated interpretation of Montana law 
regarding damages for injury to real property. Montana’s current 
interpretation allows for damages beyond simply the fair market 
value of the affected property. 
In Ruffatto, the court referred to the “general rule in Montana 
. . . that the measure of damages for permanent injuries to real 
property is the difference between the value of the property before 
and after the injury.”130 But, after Ruffatto, Montana’s view of this 
rule changed, in part because the courts recognized that a fair 
market value cap created a disincentive to restore land.131 In a 
recent decision, the Montana Supreme Court explained: 
Montana formerly followed the presumption that 
diminution in market value constituted the appropriate 
measure of damages for injury to property. The Court 
always had recognized, however, that no single measure of 
damages can serve in every case to compensate adequately 
an injured party. Our decision in Sunburst officially 
rejected any one-size-fits-all approach to property 
damages. A review of the circumstances giving rise to the 
decision in Sunburst to broaden the available remedies in 
property damages cases provides helpful guidance in 
resolving [the plaintiff’s] claim.132 
In the Sunburst decision, referred to above, the Montana 
Supreme Court acknowledged that fair market value often does not 
provide a complete picture of the scope of damages for injury to 
real property in all cases: 
It is clear that the market value of land will not always 
correspond directly to a plaintiff’s damages resulting from 
an injury to real property, thus rendering diminution in 
market value an inadequate measure of the property’s 
worth to the owner. Other courts have acknowledged that 
“the loss in market value is a poor gauge of damage” when 
the property gains its principal value from personal use 
rather than for pecuniary gain.”133 
 
through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
 130.  Ruffatto, CV-06-32-BLG-RFC, at 4 (citing Burk Ranches, Inc. v. State, 790 
P.2d 443, 445–46 (Mont. 1990)), abrogated by Lampi v. Speed, 261 P.3d 1000 
(Mont. 2011). 
 131.  Lampi, 261 P.3d at 1004 (citing Sunburst Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 
165 P.3d 1079 (Mont. 2007)). 
 132.  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 133.  Sunburst, 165 P.3d at 1088 (citations omitted).  
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The Montana Supreme Court elaborated on Sunburst in 
another case, Lampi v. Speed.134 The Lampi court explained that in 
Sunburst, Texaco operated a gasoline refinery near Sunburst, 
Montana, and had a leak that contaminated the water and soil in a 
neighboring town.135 Residents sought damages sufficient to restore 
their property, and Texaco argued that it should only have to pay 
the market value of the land it had contaminated.136 The court 
instructed the jury to award damages sufficient to restore the 
property, noting that “[l]ittle incentive would exist for tortfeasors 
to prevent or remediate contamination, especially in parts of 
Montana where property values are relatively low, if restoration 
damages could not exceed a property’s market value.”137 The court 
concluded that “statutory and common laws, such as environmental 
laws can compel repair or restoration costs in excess of the 
diminution in market value.”138 
The detailed discussion of Sunburst in Lampi makes it clear that 
current Montana law supports the Restatement’s position that fair 
market value does not cap a landowner’s damages in every case.139 
The Montana Supreme Court in Sunburst joined “other 
jurisdictions in adopting the flexible guidelines of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 929, and comment b, for the calculation of 
damages to real property to ensure that plaintiffs receive a proper 
remedy for their injuries.”140 
Returning to Kartch v. EOG Resources, Inc., which was brought 
under North Dakota’s Surface Damage Act, the U.S. District Court 
for the District of North Dakota agreed that damages were not 
capped by diminution in value for a claim brought under North 
Dakota Century Code chapter 38-11.1. The court relied on the text 
of the Surface Damages Act, however, and not the Restatement 
relied upon by the Supreme Court of Montana, finding “that 
compensable damages under North Dakota Century Code section 
38-11.1-04 are not necessarily capped by the fair market value of the 
 
 134.  261 P.3d 1000. 
 135.  Id. at 1004.  
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 139.  See Lampi, 261 P.3d at 1004 (“The [Sunburst c]ourt adopted the 
restoration damages rule from Restatement (Second) of Torts section 929.” (citing 
Sunburst, 165 P.3d at 1088)).  
 140.  Sunburst, 165 P.3d at 1088. 
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surface estate.”141 Although courts in other jurisdictions have begun 
to recognize the need for restoration damages in situations where 
oil and gas contamination occurs, this is not universal, and is not 
necessarily the case in North Dakota outside of chapter 38-11.1.142 
The underlying purpose of damages in our tort system should 
address both the need for compensation to injured parties as well 
as deterrence of situations giving rise to such damages. 
b. North Dakota Courts Are Substantially Limited Because the 
Fair Market Value Cap Is Statutory 
It is significant to note that Montana changed its view on scope 
of damages even though its oil and gas surface damage 
compensation law does not include the strong language of North 
Dakota’s law with regard to its intent and purpose.143 North 
Dakota’s statute states clearly that “the purpose of this chapter [is] 
to provide the maximum amount of constitutionally permissible protection 
to surface owners and other persons from the undesirable effects of 
development of minerals.”144 The Supreme Court of North Dakota 
has also cited favorably to section 929 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, which was relied upon in part by the Supreme Court of 
Montana in refusing to limit damages based on market value or 
diminution in value.145 The rule in North Dakota, however, has 
 
 141.  Kartch v. EOG Res., Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1008 (D.N.D. 2012). 
 142.  See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-03-09.1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. 
Sess. of the 64th Legis. Assemb.). But see id. chs. 32–40 (Environmental Law 
Enforcement Act). Although there are no reported decisions on these chapters of 
the North Dakota Century Code, it is likely that a court would find that the fair 
market value cap does not apply to these chapters for the same reasons as it does 
not apply to North Dakota Century Code chapter 38-11.1. The very underpinnings 
of the shift in judicial thinking away from strict adherence to this cap on damages 
is even more compelling under a statutory scheme specifically set up to ensure 
compliance with environmental laws and protection of natural resources. 
 143.  Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-501 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. 
Sess.) (“The purpose of this part is to provide for the protection of surface owners 
of land underlaid with oil and gas reserves while allowing for the necessary 
development of those reserves.”), with N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-11.1-02 
(Westlaw) (“It is the purpose of this chapter to provide the maximum amount of 
constitutionally permissible protection to surface owners and other persons from the 
undesirable effects of development of minerals.” (emphasis added)). 
 144.  N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-11.1-02 (Westlaw) (emphasis added). 
 145.  See Lang v. Wonnenberg, 455 N.W.2d 832, 840 (N.D. 1990) (citing 
section 929 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for the proposition that “it is 
generally recognized that damages for loss of use may be awarded in addition to 
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questionable application to different statutes as discussed, and an 
explicit amendment to section 32-03-09.1 of North Dakota Century 
Code specifically excluding real property from its application 
would make the law clear and it would be helpful in avoiding 
litigation over interpretive issues. 
V. ALTHOUGH THE LEGAL SYSTEM HAS MADE PROGRESS IN 
ADDRESSING THE FAIRNESS OF REMEDIES FOR SURFACE OWNERS, 
MORE IS NEEDED. 
The oil and gas industry has often argued for limitations on 
damages that are awarded to surface owners. There are an 
abundance of policy reasons to resist the pressure to do so. For 
example, with respect to North Dakota’s Surface Damage Act, one 
mineral developer argued that the statute was unconstitutional 
because, inter alia, it did not require a surface owner to apply 
damage payments to land restoration, and therefore was not 
forwarding the public policy of protecting agricultural land.146 The 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, explaining as follows: 
Nor does the absence of a requirement that compensated 
surface owners apply damage payments to restorative 
purposes render the statute incapable of advancing the 
public welfare. The requirement that mineral developers 
compensate surface owners for damage they cause may 
well serve as an incentive for developers not to drill, and 
thereby disrupt surface uses, where drilling is not likely to 
yield enough oil or gas to justify the loss to the economy 
from disruption of surface productivity. The 
compensation requirement might also create an incentive 
for developers not to cause unnecessary surface damage, 
and to remedy any damage—avoidable or unavoidable—
they may cause without necessitating resort to the courts 
by surface owners suing under the terms of a lease or 
under the common law of negligence.147 
 
diminution in the value of the property”); see also Lampi v. Speed, 261 P.3d 1000, 
1004 (Mont. 2011) (citing section 929 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for 
the proposition that “an award of restoration damages in excess of the property’s 
diminution in market value” is warranted in certain cases because “diminution in 
market value will not always correspond with a plaintiff’s damages resulting from 
injury to real property”). 
 146.  Murphy v. Amoco Prod. Co., 729 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 1984). 
 147.  Id. 
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This is not the only time the industry has attempted to limit 
damages in such a way. One striking example comes from a 
Louisiana case and legislative amendments.148 J. Michael Veron has 
written about a saga in Louisiana he handled, referred to as the 
“Corbello litigation.”149 In that litigation, the defendant oil and gas 
operators argued that the landowner should not be entitled to 
restoration damages because it was not certain that the landowner 
would actually use the money to restore the land.150 The 
landowners agreed to escrow a portion of their damages specifically 
to be used for cleanup.151 Once a plan was agreed upon, the 
landowners discovered they needed what they believed was a 
standard permit from the Army Corps of Engineers.152 As Mr. Veron 
has explained: 
In a remarkable turn of events, the Corbello 
consultant was informed that the permit was not being 
issued. Instead, he was summoned to a meeting in Baton 
Rouge with [Army] Corps of Engineers representatives, as 
well as representatives from state agencies. When he 
arrived, he was surprised to find one of Shell’s attorneys 
from the trial at the meeting, as well as an attorney 
representing Exxon. No one explained to the landowners’ 
representative why oil company lawyers had been invited 
to the meeting or what right they had to discuss whether a 
wetlands permit should be issued to allow the landowners 
to begin cleaning up their property. 
It soon became apparent that the attorneys were there 
to oppose the landowners’ plans. While they were 
excluded from the meeting at the landowners’ insistence, 
they were invited to meet with the regulators separately 
afterward. While the exact nature of the oil companies’ 
opposition was not disclosed to the landowners, it was 
unquestionably effective: Despite repeated efforts over the 
following year, the landowners were never able to obtain a 
permit.153 
 
 148.  J. Michael Veron, Oilfield Contamination Litigation in Louisiana: Property 
Rights on Trial, 25 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 10 (2011). 
 149.  Id. at 8. 
 150.  Id. at 13. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. at 13–14. 
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This outcome defies common sense, and is an alarming 
example of the need for a hard look at the influence of the oil and 
gas industry on landowner remedies. 
Thus, there have been some improvements in the law, 
recognized by shifts in the thinking of Montana courts regarding 
the fair market value cap, and the explicit recognition in Wyoming 
that comparable easements are acceptable measures of fair market 
value. On the other hand, there remains significant pressure from 
the oil and gas industry to constrain the legal remedies available to 
landowners, as is appallingly exemplified by Mr. Veron’s 
experience in Louisiana. North Dakota is similar in that it has 
made improvements, such as adopting North Dakota Century Code 
chapter 38-11.1 to address compensation for surface owners, and it 
also has an eminent domain statute that can be interpreted to allow 
the comparable easement testimony that is explicitly recognized in 
Wyoming. It is imperative, however, that all three branches of 
government in North Dakota recognize that there are still 
significant hindrances to providing complete justice to landowners 
faced with the negative impacts of the oil boom. Courts have 
interpreted chapter 38-11.1 to constrain damages beyond what was 
intended by the Legislative Assembly, something that both North 
Dakota courts and the legislative branch can, but have not, 
addressed. While courts have allowed landowner testimony 
regarding third party easements, other courts have refused to allow 
testimony about condemnor offers of just compensation. There is 
significant room for improvement, and so far it does not appear 
that any relief for landowners will be forthcoming from the 
executive branch. What is certain is that a myopic focus on past 
sales of agricultural land is not the way forward with respect to 
compensating landowners for the damages caused by oil and gas 
development. 
The unique nature of real property is important to 
understanding the necessity of providing adequate remedies to 
landowners beyond nominal damages based on arbitrary views of 
market value. For example, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
recognizes that contracts for the sale of land have historically been 
given a “special place in the law of specific performance” because 
land is unique and therefore “impossible of duplication by the use 
of any amount of money.”154 
 
 154.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
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Judge Loren Smith, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Claims, 
explained it as follows: 
First, the law considers each parcel of land unique. Unlike 
money, or most personal property, it is not fungible. Its 
location can never be exactly duplicated, and each 
location has a unique value. Second, the owner of land 
rarely has the same degree of liquidity as the owner of 
personal property such as stocks, bonds, gold, or the like. 
If someone does something I object to near my land, I 
generally have to deal with that action, rather than shift 
my assets. Third, people have deep emotional 
attachments to land that they rarely have towards the 
other common types of wealth. Fourth, a piece of land is 
part of a community, always connected to other land, and 
existing in a matrix of roads, rivers, and the whole of 
civilized society.155 
Mineral developers often look at past sales of agricultural land 
and assume that is the value they must pay for destroying it. This 
assumption is based on an incredibly misguided presumption: if a 
rancher is approached and asked to lease or sell a parcel of land to 
his neighbor so that his neighbor can grow wheat or run some 
cattle, the farmer will charge a certain price. If that neighbor 
approached the rancher and asked to buy the land to dump 
sterilizing wastewater or construct an industrial site on that land, 
the rancher would probably say no—but on the off chance the 
answer was yes, the price would be much greater. 
So when mineral developers argue that they need only pay the 
same rates as past agricultural sales, they are saying to the 
landowner: “We’re paying you the market rate for those acres of 
agricultural land, or even more. You should be happy.” The 
landowner’s response: This land was not for sale. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The valuation of damages caused by energy development is 
exceptionally important because it is often the only remedy 
available to landowners faced with the negative impacts of such 
development. Surface owners typically view the energy developers 
as guests on their property, but unfortunately, developers more 
 
(emphasis added). 
 155.  Loren A. Smith, The Morality of Regulation, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 507, 518 (1998). 
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often view themselves as the dominant property owner in the 
situation. When surface owners lack the ability to control what is 
happening on their own property, whether due to eminent domain 
laws or a severed mineral estate, it is imperative that these 
landowners are at least compensated for the true damage caused to 
their land, and their quality of life. 
The friction between developers attempting to minimize 
damage awards, and landowners demanding full and just 
compensation for the actual disruption energy development causes 
to their land and livelihoods has been played out in both the 
judicial and legislative forums. This friction will continue in both 
forums, and it is crucial for judges and lawmakers to recognize that 
this issue is not simply a matter of the price of an acre of land. It is 
a matter of creating policies and laws that protect the most 
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